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DUSSAULT V. RRE COACH LANTERN HOLDINGS, 
LLC: DOES THE MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
RECOGNIZE DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY FOR 
CLAIMS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION BROUGHT 
BY SECTION 8 RECIPIENTS UNDER MAINE LAW? 
Ari B. Solotoff* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC,1 Nicole Dussault filed a 
complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) alleging a 
claim of unlawful housing discrimination.2  Dussault asserted that when RRE 
Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC and Resource Real Estate Management, Inc. 
(collectively, Coach Lantern) refused to include a federal Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher Program3 tenancy addendum4 in her apartment lease, Coach 
Lantern discriminated against her because of her status as a public assistance 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author is especially grateful to 
attorneys Frank D’Allessandro, Thomas Kelley, and Katherine McGovern of Pine Tree Legal Assistance 
for the insights and experiences they shared in the development of this Note; Professor Sarah Schindler 
for her feedback and suggestions; and the Author’s colleagues on the Maine Law Review, who provided 
outstanding assistance throughout the entire publication process of volume 67, No. 1.  In addition, the 
Author wishes to extend special thanks to his wife, Natalie Stumpf Solotoff, for her unyielding support 
during three years of law school. 
 1. 2014 ME 8, 86 A.3d. 52. 
 2. Id. ¶ 9. 
 3. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.  Under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, low-income 
families receive rental subsidies in order to secure a “decent place to live.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2012).  
Once a Section 8 tenant selects a housing unit, and prior to executing the lease, the local housing 
authority verifies that the unit meets certain quality standards and that the landlord has satisfied certain 
requirements of the program.  24 C.F.R. §§ 982.305-306 (2014). 
 4. Before the lease term can begin, the landlord must execute a lease with the tenant that includes a 
tenancy addendum.  24 C.F.R. §§ 982.305(a)(3), (b)(1)(ii).  The tenancy addendum is added word-for-
word to the landlord’s standard lease and sets forth: 1) the requirements of the program; and 2) the 
composition of the household.  24 C.F.R. § 982.308(f) (2014).  In addition, the tenant has “the right to 
enforce the tenancy addendum against the [landlord], and the terms of the tenancy addendum shall 
prevail over any other provisions of the lease.”  Id.  The addendum itself is four pages long and among 
other things, requires that the landlord: 1) maintain the unit and premises in accordance with the public 
housing authority’s (“PHA”) Housing Quality Standards; 2) not raise the rent during the term of the 
initial lease; 3) charge no more rent than what HUD determines is “reasonable” or the “fair market 
value” for the community or metropolitan area; 4) not evict a tenant for the sole reason that PHA did not 
pay its share of the contract rent; 5) not evict a tenant who is a victim of domestic violence based on an 
act of domestic violence committed against her; 6) open the premises to inspection by a PHA inspector 
at the beginning of the lease, upon complaint by a tenant, and after the landlord has remedied a problem 
identified in a prior inspection; 7) allow the PHA to not begin payments until it completes the initial 
inspection; and 8) notify the PHA at least sixty days prior to any rent increase.  Dussault v. RRE Coach 
Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2011 Me. Super. LEXIS 226, at *3-4 (Nov. 9, 2011); see also Tenancy 
Addendum Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
AND URBAN DEV. (Oct. 31, 2010), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/ 
huddoc?id=DOC_11738.pdf (providing the tenancy addendum that lists the Section 8 program 
requirements). 
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recipient.5  Following an investigation and hearing, the Commission unanimously 
concluded that there were reasonable grounds for a belief of unlawful housing 
discrimination.6  Dussault then brought suit in Cumberland County Superior 
Court.7  Dussault alleged that Coach Lantern’s policy of not including a Section 8 
tenancy addendum in its standard lease constituted housing discrimination in 
violation8 of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA).9  Specifically, Dussault 
asserted three theories of discrimination under the Act: direct evidence,10 disparate 
treatment,11 and disparate impact.12  The Superior Court granted Coach Lantern’s 
motion for summary judgment, denied Dussault’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment, and ultimately ruled for Coach Lantern on all three theories of 
discrimination.13 
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Coach Lantern because the Court 
concluded that Coach Lantern’s decision not to include the Section 8 tenancy 
addendum did not constitute discrimination against Dussault by “refus[ing] to rent 
[to] or impos[ing] different terms of tenancy” on her.14  After the Court determined 
that Dussault had failed to make out a prima facie case on her claims of direct 
evidence15 and disparate treatment housing discrimination,16 the Court held that the 
MHRA does “not create disparate impact liability in the context of claims of 
housing discrimination based on a landlord’s decision not to accept the tenancy 
                                                                                                     
 5. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 9, 86 A.3d 52. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. ¶ 10. 
 8. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 (2007), repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 613, §§ 11-12 (effective Sept. 1, 2012) 
(codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A (2014)). 
 9. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4634 (2014).  See also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 10. See Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that a prima facie housing 
discrimination case requires a plaintiff to show that he or she applied for and was denied housing); 
Febres v. Challengers Caribbean, Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing a prima facie case 
as the existence of actual direct evidence that a prohibited classification played a motivating part in an 
adverse action, subject to a defendant’s burden to show that it would have made the same decision 
absent the proscribed factor). 
 11. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (describing disparate treatment 
liability in the employment setting as when an employer “treats some people less favorably than others” 
because of a protected characteristic.  “Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,” but can be shown by 
circumstantial evidence.) (citations omitted). 
 12. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 1, 86 A.3d 52.  Disparate impact liability involves a facially neutral 
practice that “fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business 
necessity.  Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required . . . .”  Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 
(citation omitted).  See also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that the federal Fair Housing Act prohibits actions with an unjustified disparate racial 
impact in the context of housing discrimination claims); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 
233 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that disparate impact liability results from “a thoughtless housing practice” 
that “can be as unfair to minority rights as a willful scheme.”).   
 13. Id. ¶ 10. 
 14. Id. ¶ 16.  The Court explained that there is no violation of the MHRA when a landlord offers an 
apartment to “recipients of public assistance on the same terms as it offers apartments to other potential 
tenants.”  Id. 
 15. Id. ¶ 21. 
 16. Id. ¶ 23. 
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addendum in order to participate” in the Section 8 voucher program.17  Because the 
Court concluded that Dussault had also failed to establish a prima facie case on her 
disparate impact claim, the Court did not “reach the issue of business necessity.”18  
Writing for the majority in the Court’s 4-3 split decision, Justice Silver reasoned 
that nothing in the plain language or legislative history19 of the statute “mandate[s] 
that landlords accept terms of tenancy that are otherwise required only if the 
landlord chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program.”20 
Concurring in the result, Justice Alexander wrote to “note that the Maine 
Legislature has explicitly rejected the change in the law . . . that would . . . mandate 
acceptance of onerous contract conditions that come with the Section 8 program . . 
. .”21  Identifying the case as an “attempt, promoted by the Maine Human Rights 
Commission, to convert the Section 8 program in Maine into a compulsory 
program,”22 Justice Alexander looked to the legislative history of section 4582 of 
the MHRA as evidence of the Legislature’s “specific refusal to change the housing 
discrimination law”23 from the Law Court’s interpretation as previously set forth in 
Catir v. Commissioner of the Department of Human Services.24  Justice Alexander 
further emphasized that the statute’s history was an “indicator of legislative intent 
that must be respected.”25 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Levy disagreed with the majority’s conclusion 
that Coach Lantern did not “refuse to rent” to Dussault within the meaning of 
section 4582 of the MHRA.26  The dissent concurred that the MHRA does not 
make participation in the Section 8 program mandatory for landlords.27  However, 
the dissent asserted that the majority misconstrued the statute’s language “to refuse 
to rent . . . to any individual . . . primarily because of the individual’s status as [a] 
recipient”28 as prohibiting only intentional discrimination, “and not housing 
decisions that have a disparate impact on such recipients.”29  Therefore, as a matter 
of statutory construction, the dissent relied on the plain meaning,30 structure,31 and 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. ¶ 29. 
 18. Id.  The majority disagreed with the dissent’s interpretation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4583 (2007) as 
effectively compelling “Maine’s landlords to participate in a voluntary federal housing subsidy program 
or risk having to litigate whether their decision not to participate is based on a ‘business necessity.’”  Id. 
¶ 28. 
 19. Id. ¶ 19. 
 20. Id. ¶ 18. 
 21. Id. ¶ 31 (Alexander, J., concurring). 
 22. Id. ¶ 33.  Justice Alexander asserted that the Commission was trying to “secure by judicial 
action an amendment to the housing discrimination laws that the Maine Legislature explicitly refused to 
adopt.”  Id. 
 23. Id. ¶ 35.  See also discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 24. 543 A.2d 356 (Me. 1988).  See also discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 25. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 35, 86 A.3d 52. 
 26. Id. ¶ 38 (Levy, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 (2007) repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 613, §§ 11-12 (effective Sept. 1, 2012) 
(codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A (2014)). 
 29. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 44, 86 A.3d 52 (Levy, J., dissenting). 
 30. See id. ¶ 46. 
 31. See id. ¶ 47 (noting that a construction of section 4582 to include disparate impact liability is 
“confirmed by viewing it in conjunction with the business necessity defense established in section 
4583.”). 
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legislative history of the statute to support its contention that disparate impact 
liability is available to public assistance recipients who assert claims of housing 
discrimination under the MHRA.32  Together with the United States Supreme 
Court’s implicit adoption of disparate impact liability in the employment setting,33 
the dissent concluded that the “Legislature’s intent to subject claims of housing 
discrimination based on the receipt of public assistance payments to disparate 
impact analysis . . . could not be clearer.”34  Because Coach Lantern failed to meet 
its burden of showing that an actual business necessity justified its decision to 
refuse to include a Section 8 tenancy addendum in its lease agreements, and 
because Dussault’s prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination went 
unrebutted, the dissent would have granted Dussault’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied summary judgment for Coach Lantern.35 
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Dussault highlight the 
three primary fault lines in other cases challenging the application of Section 8 to 
state laws that have codified housing protections for recipients of public assistance: 
First, courts have been asked to interpret whether Section 8 housing vouchers 
constitute a form of public assistance, which would consequently implicate laws 
protecting an individual’s status as a public aid recipient.36  Second, courts have 
confronted the question of whether participation in the federal Section 8 housing 
program is voluntary or mandatory for landlords.37  Third, courts have taken up the 
question of whether Section 8 tenants may assert disparate impact claims when 
landlords refuse to accept the housing vouchers because of the program’s 
administrative requirements.38  Although the Supreme Court has never directly 
ruled on the application of the disparate impact standard to the federal Fair Housing 
Act,39 every federal court of appeals, with the exception of the D.C. Circuit, has 
determined that liability exists for housing practices that have discriminatory 
effects.40 
                                                                                                     
 32. See id. ¶ 48. 
 33. See id. ¶ 46 (referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 429-36 (1971), which held that disparate impact liability is recognized by Title VII’s prohibition 
against racially discriminatory employment tests). 
 34. Id. ¶ 48. 
 35. Id. ¶ 59. 
 36. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 333 (Md. 2007) (holding 
that source of income protections include Section 8 voucher holders).  But see Knapp v. Eagle Prop. 
Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Wisconsin housing protection statute 
does not incorporate Section 8 vouchers as a source of income). 
 37. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 245 
(Conn. 1999) (discussing in detail whether federal preemption makes participation in the Section 8 
program voluntary for landlords). 
 38. See Tamica H. Daniel, Note, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher Program: 
Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 769, 788 (2010) 
(discussing courts which have both upheld and rejected disparate impact claims made by Section 8 
recipients under the federal Fair Housing Act). 
 39. See Robert G. Schwemm & Sara K. Pratt, Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act: A Proposed 
Approach, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE 4 (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/portals/33/ 
disparate%20impact%20analysis%20final.pdf 
 40. See id. at 6-7.  Moreover, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
promulgated a final rule in 2013 establishing uniform standards for evaluating disparate impact claims 
under the FHA.  See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2014). 
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Thus, the Law Court’s decision—to hold “as a matter of law, that the MHRA, 
as currently established . . . does not create disparate impact liability” for housing 
discrimination claims made by Section 8 recipients—represents just one point on a 
spectrum of court decisions that have interpreted similar public assistance 
antidiscrimination housing statutes in other states.41  Within this context, this Note 
considers whether the Court’s holding was a principled approach to statutory 
interpretation, or whether the Court hastily adopted a rule precluding disparate 
impact liability for claims of housing discrimination when brought by Section 8 
recipients. 
This Note proceeds first in Part II by reviewing the federal and state laws 
underlying the Court’s decision in Dussault.  After describing the application of the 
MHRA to housing discrimination claims, Part II examines the legislative history of 
sections 4582 and 4583, as well as the Court’s previous decision in Catir.  Part III 
describes the facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, as well as the 
Court’s decision and accompanying concurring and dissenting opinions.  Part IV 
analyzes the implications of the Court’s holding and concludes that although the 
Court reasonably concluded that disparate impact liability is not available for 
Section 8 recipients under the MHRA, the Court’s construction of the MHRA was 
strikingly narrow in light of the statute’s purpose and was inconsistent with general 
principles of statutory construction.  This Note closes by recommending that the 
Maine Legislature amend the MHRA to expressly include protections against 
discrimination for Section 8 recipients. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Federal Fair Housing Laws & Public Assistance Housing Discrimination  
1.  The Federal Fair Housing Act 
Known today as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII),42 
Congress passed the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) in order to achieve two 
principle goals: eliminating housing discrimination in public and private spheres 
and increasing the overall availability of access to housing opportunities for all 
Americans.43  The Act was passed soon after the summer of 1967, during which 
time rioting and civil disturbances “rocked the central cores of many of the nation’s 
major cities.”44  At the time, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a commission 
to “focus[] attention on the discontent of the people trapped in the nation’s 
ghettoes,” and to examine the “problems of residential segregation and racial slum 
                                                                                                     
 41. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 26, 86 A.3d 52.  See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 42. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012)). 
 43. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (stating that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide . . .  
for fair housing throughout the United States”); Kinara Flagg, Comment, Mending the Safety Net 
Through Source of Income Protections: The Nexus Between Antidiscrimination and Social Welfare Law, 
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201, 229 (2011). 
 44. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
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formation.”45  As enacted, the FHA provides that “it shall be unlawful . . . [t]o 
refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”46  
The Supreme Court has stated that the language and interpretation of Title VIII is 
“broad and inclusive.”47  Following enactment of the FHA, Congress amended the 
Act to include protections based on sex,48 people with disabilities, and families 
with children.49  Although the FHA does not expressly prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of receipt of public assistance, a number of other federal statutes have 
included such protections.50   
2.  The Section 8 Housing Program  
As a Depression-era statute, Congress enacted the United States Housing Act 
in 1937.51  Public housing projects were the dominant form of low-income housing 
assistance until Congress passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 
1965.52  In 1974, Congress passed the Housing and Community Development Act 
which created the federal fair housing program known today as Section 8.53  The 
Section 8 program was established “[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income 
families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed 
housing . . . .”54  In 1987, Congress enacted a rental voucher program as part of a 
second Housing and Community Development Act.55  It was not until 1998 that 
Congress merged its 1974 certificate and 1987 voucher programs into a single 
Housing Choice Voucher Program.56   
As it currently operates, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) is authorized to enter into annual contracts with local 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id.  The Commission also “recognized that discrimination in housing is a major contributing 
factor to racial isolation in urban schools.”  Id. at 497. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
 47. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
 48. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 
633, 728-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (2012)). 
 49. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012)). 
 50. See Flagg, supra note 43, at 216-20 (discussing statutory protections on the basis of source of 
income in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
program, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).  
 51. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 327 (Md. 2007) (noting that 
the Act’s purpose was to develop additional housing stock, create jobs, clear slums, and to provide funds 
for local housing agencies to build and manage public housing projects).   
 52. Id. at 328.  The 1965 Act “authorized a new program under which [public housing agencies], 
through contracts with private owners, could lease apartment units in existing private apartment 
buildings and then sublease those units to current public housing tenants.”  Id. 
 53. Id.  The Section 8 name stems from an authorization to rewrite § 8 of the United States Housing 
Act of 1937.  Id. at 328 n.1. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012). 
 55. See Glenmont Hills, 936 A.2d at 329. 
 56. See id. 
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public housing agencies (PHAs),57 which in turn make assistance payments to 
owners of existing rental units.58  Historically, Section 8 provided two types of 
public housing assistance: project-based59 and tenant-based.60  The tenant-based 
program—also known as the Housing Choice Voucher Program—first establishes 
fair market rents for each region within the United States.61  The local PHA then 
adopts a payment schedule corresponding to its rental region, which must fall 
within ninety percent and one hundred ten percent of the relevant fair market rent.62   
In order for an individual to qualify for Section 8 rental assistance, that individual 
must be classified as either very low income or low income.63  A tenant identifies a 
suitable home within the reasonable rent guidelines and pays a portion of the rental 
cost commensurate with his or her income, typically thirty-percent of adjusted 
gross income.64 
Before the lease is finalized, the local PHA confirms that the tenant-selected 
property meets HUD quality and market rate standards.65  This process entails: 1) a 
physical inspection of the apartment by the local PHA to ensure quality 
compliance;66 2) confirmation that the rent falls within the established market 
rate;67 and 3) verification that the lease conforms with HUD requirements, 
including incorporation of a HUD-prepared tenancy addendum setting forth the 
rights of the tenant and landlord.68  Thus, once approved, the Section 8 
collaboration between state and local PHAs and HUD provides subsidies to 
landlords who rent to low-income tenants.69 
3.  Federal and State Law Protections for Section 8 Recipients 
Under federal law, landlords are neither expressly required to participate in the 
                                                                                                     
 57. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2014) (defining a public housing agency as “[a]ny State, county, 
municipality or other governmental entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality thereof) which is 
authorized to engage in or assist in the development or operation of housing for low-income Families”). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (2012). 
 59. See Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing Act Claims: 
Landlord Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1977 (2010) 
(describing the large-scale public building projects as “concentrating the misery and hopelessness of 
poverty in large, segregated projects”) (citation omitted). 
 60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b) (2014). 
 61. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113 (2014).   
 62. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(1)(i) (2014). 
 63. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.201(a)-(b) (2014) (listing Section 8 income eligibility requirements). 
 64. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.503, 505, 515 (2014); see also Housing Choice Voucher Program 
Guidebook, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 7-6, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ 
documents/huddoc?id=DOC_11751.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(o)(8)(A)-(B) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2014).  For a graphic illustration 
of the process by which the Section 8 program is administered, see Housing Choice Voucher Program 
Guidebook, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 1-16, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/ 
huddoc?id=DOC_11745.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
 66. 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2014). 
 67. 24 C.F.R. § 982.507 (2014). 
 68. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 330 (Md. 2007). 
 69. Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993).  For an overview of the delivery of 
statewide affordable housing programs in Maine, see Blue Ribbon Commission on Affordable Housing, 
Final Report to the 125th Legislature 11-13 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/ 
AffordableHousingStudyrpt.pdf [hereinafter Blue Ribbon Report]. 
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Section 8 program, nor must they accept Section 8 vouchers as payment.70  Instead, 
selection of a tenant is left to the discretion of the landlord,71 subject to prohibitions 
against refusing to rent based on a tenant’s color, religion, sex, national origin, age, 
familial status, or disability.72  The Section 8 program, therefore, functions as a 
“cooperative venture” between HUD and state and local PHAs that oversee the 
program’s daily operations.73  The federal legislation and accompanying 
regulations, therefore, are “superimposed upon and consciously interdependent 
with the sub-structure of local law relating to housing.”74  Because the “[f]ederal 
statute merely creates the scheme and sets out the guidelines for the funding and 
implementation of the program . . . [i]t does not preclude State regulation.”75   
Thirteen states have adopted laws—similar in nature, but each worded slightly 
differently—prohibiting housing discrimination based on a tenant’s source of 
income.76  In addition, a number of local municipalities have also approved 
ordinances that incorporate housing discrimination protections for individuals who 
rely upon public assistance.77  Given the lack of textual uniformity and the absence 
of federal legislation expressly prohibiting discrimination against Section 8 
recipients,78 reviewing courts have produced a wide spectrum of decisions in 
                                                                                                     
 70. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.302(b) (2014) (providing that “[i]f the family finds a unit, and the owner is 
willing to lease the unit under the program, the family may request PHA approval of the tenancy.”); see 
also Glenmont Hills, 936 A.2d at 330. 
 71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) (2012); see also Comm’n on Human Rights and Opportunities 
v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 245 n.22 (Conn. 1999) (emphasizing that there is “no express 
language in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f to the effect that landlord participation in section 8 programs is 
voluntary,” but that those courts which have found the program to be voluntary have relied on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437(f)(d)(1)(A) as well as the regulations under 24 C.F.R. § 982.452(b)(1) which give landlords 
authority to select a voucher holder and to determine rental eligibility). 
 72. 24 C.F.R. § 982.304 (2014). 
 73. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d at 244. 
 74. Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Mass. 1987) (citation omitted). 
 75. Id. at 1106. 
 76. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12955(a), (p)(1) (West 2014) (including a definition for “source of 
income”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63 (3); 46a-64c (a)(1) (West 2014) (including a definition for 
“lawful source of income”); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21(e) (2014) (explicitly protecting Section 8 
recipients); 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A (2014) (protecting individuals on the basis of their “status” as 
recipients); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(10) (West 2014) (prohibiting discrimination against 
public assistance or rental subsidy recipients, or “because of any requirement of such” programs); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 363A.09(1) (West 2014) (including “status with regard to public assistance”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12(g)(1) (West 2014) (precluding housing discrimination on the basis of “source 
of lawful income”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-01 (West 2014) (including “status with regard to 
. . . public assistance”); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 1452(A)(8) (West 2014) (defining unlawful housing 
discrimination as refusing to consider as a “valid source of income any public assistance”); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 659a.421(1)(d) (West 2014) (prohibiting source of income discrimination but specifically 
excluding Section 8 “rent subsidy payments under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5(1) 
(West 2014) (prohibiting “source of income” discrimination); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4503(a)(1) (West 
2014) (precluding discrimination “because a person is a recipient of public assistance”); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 106.50(1) (West 2014) (rendering discrimination on the basis of “lawful source of income” as 
unlawful). 
 77. See Krista Sterken, A Different Type of Housing Crisis: Allocating Costs Fairly and 
Encouraging Landlord Participation in Section 8, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 215, 223 nn.42-44 
(2009) (listing municipal ordinances with source of income housing protections). 
 78. See Jenna Bernstein, Note, Section 8, Source of Income Discrimination, and Federal 
Preemption: Setting the Record Straight, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1407, 1415-16 (2010) (noting that since 
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response to parties who challenge the application of state public assistance 
antidiscrimination housing laws to Section 8 recipients.79 
B.  The MHRA and Maine’s Fair Housing Protections for  
Recipients of Public Assistance 
1.  Unlawful Housing Discrimination Under the MHRA 
Recognizing a “basic human right to a life with dignity,”80 the Maine 
Legislature enacted the Maine Human Rights Act in 1971 to “prevent 
discrimination in employment, housing or access to public accommodations” on 
account of a protected trait.81  Discrimination, as defined in the statute, “includes, 
without limitation, [to] segregate or separate.”82  The MHRA did not originally 
include a prohibition against housing discrimination for public assistance recipients 
seeking rental property.  Instead, the MHRA codified a civil right to obtain “decent 
housing” without fear of discrimination on the basis of the limited classifications of 
“race, color, religious creed, ancestry or national origin.”83 
Although recipients of public assistance were not included in section 4581’s 
original listing of individuals entitled to “decent housing,” as of October 1, 1975, 
the Legislature amended section 4582 in order to add protections for recipients of 
public assistance.84  Specifically, section 4582 provided, in relevant part, that it 
shall be unlawful:  
For any person furnishing rental premises to refuse to rent or impose different 
terms of tenancy to any individual who is a recipient of federal, state or local 
public assistance, including medical assistance and housing subsidies solely 
because of such individual’s status as such recipient.85 
                                                                                                     
Congressional repeal of the “take one, take all” requirement from the Section 8 program, Congress has 
not imposed any new requirements on landlords). 
 79. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 342 (Md. 2007) (holding 
that Glenmont Hills discriminated by refusing to rent to otherwise qualified tenants because they 
proposed to use Section 8 vouchers, thereby discriminating on the basis of source of income); Comm’n 
on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 251 (Conn. 1999) (holding that 
the legislature intended to require landlords to accept section 8 vouchers).  But see Knapp v. Eagle Prop. 
Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that section 8 assistance does not fall 
within the statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of lawful source of income); Edwards v. 
Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 783 N.W.2d 171, 177-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a landlord’s 
refusal to continue participation in the voluntary section 8 program does not constitute unlawful status 
discrimination).  Although not discussed by this Note, challengers have also argued that the voluntary 
nature of Section 8 participation under federal law preempts any mandatory protections for public 
assistance recipients under state law.  See, e.g., Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 
1111-12 (N.J. 1999) (reviewing the preemption argument and applicable case law); Bernstein, supra 
note 78, at 1408. 
 80. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4552 (2014). 
 81. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 82. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(2) (2014). 
 83. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 1.  Section 4581 has since been amended to declare a civil right to be free 
from discrimination in housing because of an individual’s “race, color, sex, sexual orientation, physical 
or mental disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status.”  5 M.R.S.A. § 4581 (2014). 
 84. P.L. 1975, ch. 151, § 1. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Section 4583 was also amended in 1975 to conform with the adjustments to 
section 4582.86  It provided, in relevant part, that: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed in any manner to prohibit or limit the 
exercise of the privilege of every person and the agent of any person having the 
right to sell, rent, lease or manage a housing accommodation to set up and enforce 
specifications in the selling, renting, leasing, or letting thereof . . . which are not 
based on race, color, sex, physical handicap, religion or country of ancestral 
origin, the receipt of public assistance payments of any prospective or actual 
purchaser, lessee, tenant or occupant thereof.87 
In 1989, the Maine Legislature further amended section 4582, and substituted 
the word “primarily” for the word “solely” when evaluating the issue of causation 
by a landlord’s refusal to rent in connection with that individual’s status as a 
recipient of public assistance.88 
Most recently, in 2007, the Legislature modified section 4583 of the MHRA 
and expressly codified for the first time a “business necessity” defense for 
landlords,89 as well as the availability of disparate impact liability for 
discrimination against a protected class.90  Under the current language of the Act, 
unless a landlord can demonstrate a business necessity justifying refusal, a landlord 
may not “refuse to rent or impose different terms of tenancy on any individual who 
is a recipient of . . . public assistance . . . primarily because of the individual’s 
status” as a public aid recipient.91 
2.  The Legislative History of Sections 4582 and 4583 of the MHRA 
The Statement of Fact that accompanied the Legislature’s 1975 amendment to 
the unlawful housing provisions of the MHRA found that landlords who refused to 
rent to public assistance recipients discriminated because such “refusals to rent . . . 
are not made with reference to the tenant’s personal responsibility and integrity; but 
only on the general misapprehension that a family on public assistance is 
automatically an undesirable tenant.”92  Moreover, the stated purpose of the bill 
amending the MHRA was to “enable those citizens of Maine most in need of 
housing to have a fair and equal chance at obtaining it.”93  However, when the 
                                                                                                     
 86. P.L. 1975, ch. 151, § 2. 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88. P.L. 1989, ch. 245, § 4.  In Vance v. Speakman, the Court reviewed the addition of the more 
restrictive word “solely” to the last paragraph of section 4582.  409 A.2d 1307, 1309 (Me. 1979).  The 
Court noted, that whereas “all of the provisions of the Human Rights Act prohibit discrimination that is 
merely ‘because of,’” as opposed to “‘solely because of’ factors such as age, race, or sex,” in the case of 
landlords and extenders of credit, the legislature granted “a more restrictive test than that prevailing for 
employment and other forms of prohibited discrimination.”  Id. at 1309-10.  
 89. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4583 (2007) (stating in relevant part that “[n]othing in this Act may be construed 
to prohibit or limit the exercise of the privilege of every person . . . having the right to sell, rent, lease or 
manage a housing accommodation to set up and enforce specifications in the selling, renting, leasing or 
letting . . . that are consistent with business necessity and are not based on . . . the receipt of public 
assistance payments by any prospective or actual purchaser, lessee, tenant, or occupant.”). 
 90. See L.D. 685, Summary (123rd Legis. 2007).  
 91. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A(4) (2014). 
 92. L.D. 327, Statement of Fact (107th Legis. 1975).   
 93. Id. 
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Legislature next amended section 4582 of the MHRA in 2007, the Legislature 
explicitly rejected a section from the final bill amendment that would have 
prohibited a landlord from refusing to rent to or imposing different terms of 
tenancy on any individual “primarily because of the individual’s status as [a] 
recipient or because of any requirement of such a public assistance program.”94   
In 2007, the Maine Human Rights Commission introduced L.D. 685 in order to 
“clarify the protections of the Act . . . and [to] prohibit unreasonable housing 
practices that have a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, sex, sexual 
orientation, physical or mental disability, religion, country of ancestral origin, 
familial status or the receipt of public assistance payments.”95  The amendment, as 
proposed by the Maine Human Rights Commission in L.D. 685, was intended to 
“ensure that a housing provider cannot refuse to rent or impose different terms of 
tenancy because of the requirements of a public assistance program,” and was also 
proposed to address “a recurring problem with landlords arguing that they do not 
want to do paperwork or comply with other requirements of public assistance 
programs such as Section 8.”96   
Section 2 of L.D. 685 was modeled after a similar amendment to 
Massachusetts law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of receipt of public 
assistance.97  The modification to Maine law, as proposed by the Maine Human 
Rights Commission, was designed to ensure that “a housing provider [could not] 
refuse to rent or impose different terms of tenancy because of the . . . paperwork or 
other program requirements” of a public assistance program.98  However, at a 
public hearing on L.D. 685, representatives for the Maine Apartment Owners and 
Managers Association testified that some Section 8 requirements were “too 
burdensome” for landlords.99   
Consistent with the Commission’s recommendation that section 4582 
precluded discriminatory housing practices that have a disparate impact, the 
Commission also proposed an amendment to section 4583.  By adding the language 
“consistent with business necessity” to the operation of section 4583, the 
Commission sought to resolve a conflict in which “a bona fide neutral practice 
[could not] be challenged, even if it has a disparate impact on a protected class.”100  
On May 29, 2007, the Judiciary Committee expressly amended L.D. 685 “by 
striking out all of section 2” containing the language prohibiting housing 
discrimination against public assistance recipients because of a program’s 
requirements.101  All other provisions within L.D. 685, including the “business 
                                                                                                     
 94. L.D. 685, § 2 (123rd Legis. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 95. An Act to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act: Hearing on L.D. 685 Before the Joint Standing 
Comm. on Judiciary, L.D. 685 at 1-2 (123rd Legis. 2007) [hereinafter Ryan Letter] (emphasis added) 
(letter from Ms. Patricia Ryan, Exec. Dir. of the Maine Human Rights Comm’n.).  
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 422 n.2 (Mass. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
 98. An Act to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act: Hearing on L.D. 685 Before the Joint Standing 
Comm. on Judiciary, L.D. 685 at 1 (123rd Legis. 2007) (memorandum from Ms. Peggy Reinsch, Office 
of Policy and Legal Analysis). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Ryan Letter, supra note 95, at 4-5. 
 101. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 685, No. S-162 (123rd Legis. 2008). 
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necessity” modification of section 4583, were enacted with the exception of the 
change proposed by section 2.102 
3.  The Catir Decision 
The Law Court previously interpreted the language of section 4582 of the 
MHRA in Catir v. Commissioner of the Department of Human Services.103  In 
Catir, the Law Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for a nursing home 
when there was “no allegation or suggestion that the nursing home refused to rent 
or imposed different terms of tenancy on Medicaid recipients.”104  When the 
nursing home decided that it would no longer accept the Medicaid rate of payment 
or patients unable to pay the nursing home’s higher rate, several Medicaid 
recipients brought suit under the MHRA to enjoin the nursing home from 
discontinuing their services.105  Although the plaintiffs alleged that section 4582 of 
the MHRA prohibited the nursing home from terminating services for Medicaid 
recipients,106 the Court concluded that the nursing home refused to accept the 
Medicaid rate of payment and “subjected the recipients to the same terms of 
tenancy offered to any other individual.”107  Moreover, the Court noted that fair 
housing access under the MHRA is “premised upon the assumption that the persons 
seeking the housing have the ability to pay.”108 
III.  DUSSAULT V. RRE COACH LANTERN HOLDINGS, LLC 
A.  Factual Background 
In June 2008, Nicole Dussault and her three children found themselves 
homeless after Dussault’s home was foreclosed upon.109  Dussault obtained a rental 
assistance voucher on July 14, 2008 pursuant to the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher program administered by Avesta Housing, a nonprofit organization 
contracted by the Maine State Housing Authority.110  On August 5, 2008, Dussault 
called Coach Lantern Apartments in Scarborough to inquire about renting a three-
bedroom apartment that she had identified on Craigslist.111  The dwelling’s rental 
rate was within the limits of the voucher program and the Scarborough location 
allowed Dussault to keep her son in the same school system he had previously 
attended.112  The apartment complex was owned by RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, 
LLC.113 
                                                                                                     
 102. See P.L. 2007, ch. 243. 
 103. 543 A.2d 356 (Me. 1988). 
 104. Id. at 357-58 (quotations omitted).   
 105. Id. at 357.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 358. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Brief for Appellant at 1, Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8, 86 A.3d 
52 (No. CUM-11-591). 
 110. Id. 
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Dussault alleged that when she disclosed that she intended to use a voucher to 
help pay the rent, she was informed that Coach Lantern did not accept vouchers.114  
Dussault’s Preble Street caseworker was told the same thing after calling on 
Dussault’s behalf.115  About two weeks later, Dussault called Coach Lantern again 
and refrained from disclosing her intent to use a voucher.116    After successfully 
scheduling and being shown the apartment, Dussault was given and completed a 
rental application.117  On the application, Dussault indicated that she would be 
using a voucher to pay the rent.118  Dussault was accepted after qualifying for an 
apartment.119 
Pursuant to federal regulations, the Avesta caseworker notified Coach Lantern 
that it was required to include a HUD tenancy addendum in Dussault’s lease as a 
condition of Section 8 and in order for Dussault to use the voucher.120  On 
September 3, 2008, Coach Lantern, through its attorney, notified Avesta Housing 
in writing of its “problem with the inclusion of a Tenancy Addendum with [the 
standard] lease.”121  The attorney’s letter further stated that: 
I wish to make it absolutely clear that my client is not refusing to rent to [Dussault] 
primarily because she is a recipient of public assistance, but because [t]he 
addendum includes more restrictive rights and obligations on the landlord th[a]n 
the standard lease that they use, and my client does not wish to be bound by these 
more restrictive obligations.122   
On September 12, 2008, Avesta Housing replied by email, informing Coach 
Lantern that it had to include the tenancy addendum in order to rent to Dussault.123 
Coach Lantern refused to attach the tenancy addendum to Dussault’s lease.124  
Furthermore, Coach Lantern objected to seven different requirements of the 
addendum ranging from housing quality standards to eviction restrictions to 
inspection requirements.125  Dussault did not rent the apartment, and ultimately 
found housing in South Portland because she was unable to use the voucher to rent 
the Coach Lantern apartment.126 
B.  Procedural History 
Dussault filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission in 
November 2008, alleging that Coach Lantern violated section 4582 of the MHRA 
and that its policy of refusing to attach the HUD tenancy addendum to her lease 
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 4, 86 A.3d 52. 
 120. Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at 1. 
 121. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 6, 86 A.3d 52. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. ¶ 7.  See also Brief for Appellees at 5, Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 
ME 8, 86 A.3d 52 (No. CUM-11-591). 
 125. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 7, 86 A.3d 52. 
 126. Id. ¶ 8. 
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constituted discrimination on the basis of her status as a recipient of public 
assistance.127  The Commission completed an investigation and unanimously 
concluded that reasonable grounds existed to believe that unlawful housing 
discrimination had occurred against Dussault because of her status as a public aid 
recipient.128 
Dussault then filed a complaint in Superior Court to obtain declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and damages.129  In response to Coach Lantern’s motion for 
summary judgment, Dussault filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on three 
theories of discrimination: direct evidence, disparate treatment, and disparate 
impact.130  The trial court granted Coach Lantern’s motion for summary judgment 
and denied Dussault’s cross-motion.131  The court ruled in favor of Coach Lantern 
on each of the three theories of discrimination.132 
The trial court first concluded that there was no direct evidence of 
discrimination and, therefore, declined to conduct a mixed-motives analysis.133  
The court next determined that Dussault failed to meet her burden to produce 
sufficient evidence that Coach Lantern’s proffered reasons for refusing to 
participate in the voucher program were pretextual under the three-step burden-
shifting analysis which courts apply to identify circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination.134  Lastly, the court performed a disparate impact analysis and 
determined that Coach Lantern’s policy of refusing to attach the HUD addendum 
affects public assistance recipients more harshly than those who do not intend to 
use vouchers, but that Coach Lantern’s actions were justified by the business 
necessity defense.135 
Dussault appealed.136 
C.  Arguments on Appeal 
On appeal, Dussault asserted three arguments: First, Dussault argued that 
under the plain language of the statute, receipt of a Section 8 subsidy is included in 
“public assistance protection.”137  Accordingly, Dussault asserted that Coach 
Lantern’s refusal to include the Section 8 addendum constituted unlawful 
discrimination contrary to legislative intent.138  Dussault also argued that the court 
erred in failing to defer to the prior interpretations and approach of the Maine 
Human Rights Commission,139 and that when reading the entire statutory scheme of 
sections 4582 and 4583 as a whole, the Legislature’s incorporation of the business 
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 134. Id.  See supra note 11. 
 135. Id.  See supra note 12. 
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 137. Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at 9. 
 138. Id. at 10. 
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necessity defense “ameliorates any negative inference that might be drawn from the 
Judiciary Committee’s election to drop” the language making it illegal housing 
discrimination to refuse to rent “because of any requirement of such a public 
assistance program.”140  Dussault also argued that the trial court erred in its 
application of the business necessity defense141 because Coach Lantern had failed 
to offer any “credible admissible evidence that demonstrates that any of their 
objections meet the business necessity standard.”142 
Second, Dussault asserted that the court erred in denying summary judgment 
on her claim of direct evidence discrimination.143  Dussault argued that Coach 
Lantern’s “overt refusal to sign the lease amendment is direct evidence of 
Defendants’ intent to discriminate.”144  Because Coach Lantern admitted its 
willingness to rent to Dussault based on her individual characteristics,145 Dussault 
argued that Coach Lantern had no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying 
Dussault the opportunity to rent.146  Finally, Dussault argued that Coach Lantern’s 
assertions of administrative burdens were not supported by sufficient and 
admissible record evidence.147 
Coach Lantern, on the other hand, argued in response that “[t]he language of 
the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), its legislative history, and a large body of 
case law regarding discrimination indicate” that Section 8 participation is not 
mandatory.148  In support of its argument, Coach Lantern asserted that the trial 
court “correctly concluded that Coach Lantern did not violate the MHRA because 
nothing in the statute, legislative history, or the law of discrimination generally 
requires landlords to accept less favorable terms in order to make it possible for a 
recipient of public assistance to rent.”149  Arguing under the plain language of the 
statute, Coach Lantern asserted that “the statute requires nothing more than equal 
treatment: that landlords offer recipients of public assistance housing on the same 
terms and conditions they offer housing to everyone else and that they not refuse to 
rent to an individual because of stereotypes about welfare recipients.”150  Pointing 
to the fact that the legislature “enacted each and every proposed amendment to the 
MHRA contained within L.D. 685 except the provision that would have made it 
unlawful to refuse to rent to a recipient of public assistance because of the burdens 
associated with the program,” Coach Lantern asserted that legislative inaction 
meant that the “Legislature did not want to make participation in programs such as 
Section 8 mandatory.”151  Coach Lantern further argued that Commission decisions 
are not entitled to any deference because they lack precedential or persuasive 
                                                                                                     
 140. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis omitted). 
 141. Id. at 22. 
 142. Id. at 26. 
 143. Id. at 27.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 29 (noting that Coach Lantern was not concerned with Dussault’s personal history, 
criminal history, past rental history, bad references, or an inability to pay the rent). 
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 147. Id. at 36-37. 
 148. Brief for Appellees, supra note 124, at 2. 
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 151. Id. at 14. 
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force.152 
Coach Lantern additionally asserted that there was no evidence that 
“Dussault’s status as a recipient of public assistance—as opposed to burdens 
associated with participating in Section 8—was a motivating factor, let alone the 
primary factor” in Coach Lantern’s decision not to include the HUD tenancy 
addendum in its standard lease.153  Furthermore, Coach Lantern clarified that 
“endeavoring to maintain as much control as possible over the terms of tenancy and 
not wanting to incur additional costs and burdens associated with Section 8 
participation are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not renting to tenants 
who require a Section 8 subsidy.”154  Finding Catir to be on point, Coach Lantern 
stated that “[t]here is no practical difference between what the nursing home was 
being asked to give up in Catir and what Ms. Dussault contends Coach Lantern is 
required to give up in this case.”155  In both instances, “the defendant was sued for 
failing to do business on terms less favorable than it did business with others.”156  
Lastly, Coach Lantern distinguished its refusal to contract on more onerous 
terms from a “policy or practice” that has a disparate impact on recipients of public 
assistance.157  Identifying the former as a “refusal to undertake an affirmative act, at 
a cost,” Coach Lantern asserted that the trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment on Dussault’s claim of disparate impact liability because Dussault had 
failed to identify any facially neutral policy or practice, and alternatively, that 
Coach Lantern’s actions were supported by legitimate business reasons.158    
D.  Decision of the Law Court 
Justice Silver, writing for the majority, first synthesized the language of 
sections 4582 and 4583 to mean that “a landlord may not refuse to rent to, or 
impose different terms of tenancy on” a public assistance recipient unless the 
landlord can demonstrate a business necessity justifying refusal.159  The Court 
further explained that the plain language of section 4582’s prohibition against 
“refus[al] to rent or impos[ition of] different terms of tenancy” is narrower than the 
broader prohibitions of housing discrimination on other protected bases under the 
MHRA.160  After reviewing the Court’s previous holding in Catir v. Commissioner 
of the Department of Human Services,161 the majority concluded that the 
“undisputed facts demonstrate that Coach Lantern did not ‘refuse to rent [to] or 
impose different terms of tenancy’ on Dussault.”162  The Court noted that Coach 
                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 17-18. 
 153. Id. at 23. 
 154. Id. at 27. 
 155. Id. at 29. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 31. 
 158. Id. at 31-39. 
 159. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 13, 86 A.3d. 52. 
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 161. 543 A.2d 356, 357-58 (Me. 1988). 
 162. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 16, 86 A.3d 52 (alteration in original).  
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Lantern offered and was willing to rent the apartment to Dussault after learning of 
her status, “so long as it could do so without including the tenancy addendum.”163  
The Court stated that “[i]n essence, Coach Lantern offered to rent the apartment to 
Dussault on ‘the same terms of tenancy offered to any other individual.’”164  Thus, 
the Court concluded that there was no violation of the MHRA because Coach 
Lantern was willing to offer the apartment to Dussault on the same terms that it 
offered apartments to other prospective tenants.165 
Turning to the statute itself, the Court explained why section 4582’s language, 
purpose, and legislative history precluded any attempt to “read into the MHRA a 
mandate that landlords accept terms of tenancy that are otherwise required only if 
the landlord chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program.”166  First, the 
Court stated that Coach Lantern refused to include the tenancy addendum not 
“primarily because of [Dussault’s] status as recipient,” but because Coach Lantern 
“did not wish to bind itself to the terms of the tenancy addendum.”167  Second, the 
Court “recognize[d] the MHRA’s purpose to protect public assistance recipients’ 
rights to secure decent housing,” but declined to “read into the MHRA a mandate 
that landlords accept terms of tenancy that are otherwise required only if the 
landlord chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program.”168  Third, the Court 
felt constrained by the “language that the Legislature ha[d] enacted;”169 although 
the “Legislature ha[d] considered a bill that would have effectively required 
landlords to participate in the voucher program,” the Court was unwilling to 
“substitute [its] policy judgment for that of the Legislature.”170 
Next, the Court raised and analyzed each of the three theories of unlawful 
discrimination asserted by Dussault in light of its preceding analysis of the 
MHRA.171  With respect to the claim of direct evidence discrimination, the Court 
examined whether Dussault’s “status as a public assistance recipient was a 
‘motivating factor’ in the landlord’s refusal to rent to her.”172  The Court concluded 
that Dussault failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination on this theory 
because “the undisputed facts demonstrate that, in declining to include the tenancy 
addendum in the lease, Coach Lantern did not ‘refuse to rent or impose different 
terms of tenancy’ on Dussault based primarily upon her status as a recipient of 
public assistance.”173  In analyzing Dussault’s disparate treatment claim, the Court 
similarly concluded that Dussault failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.174  Again, the Court determined that Coach Lantern’s decision was 
not “based primarily upon [Dussault’s] status as a recipient of public assistance.”175   
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Finally, drawing on the Court’s burden-shifting analysis for disparate impact 
claims made in the employment context, the Court concluded that “[n]othing in the 
language of the MHRA . . . imposes disparate impact liability on a landlord for 
discrimination against an individual because of the individual’s status as a recipient 
of public assistance.”176  Rather than broadening the protections available to public 
assistance recipients, the Court viewed the business necessity defense under section 
4583 as a limitation on their rights.177  Finding nothing expressly in the text of the 
statute or its history, the Court concluded “as a matter of law, that the MHRA, as 
currently established by the Maine Legislature, does not create disparate impact 
liability” for housing discrimination claims based on a landlord’s refusal to 
“participate in the voluntary voucher program established by Section 8.”178 
In closing, the majority refuted three arguments set forth in the dissenting 
opinion: First, the majority noted that unlike the MHRA, discrimination on the 
basis of an individual’s status as a recipient of public assistance is not prohibited 
under the federal Fair Housing Act.179  The Court found the dissent’s reliance on 
the otherwise broad definition of discrimination under the FHA to be misguided as 
compared with the “MHRA’s relatively narrow prohibition of ‘refus[al] to rent or 
impos[istion of] different terms of tenancy’” based primarily on a person’s status as 
a public assistance recipient.180  Second, the majority criticized the dissent’s 
interpretation of section 4583, suggesting that it would “effectively compel 
Maine’s landlords to participate in a voluntary federal housing subsidy program or 
risk having to litigate whether their decision not to participate is based on a 
‘business necessity.’”181  Given the Court’s previous holding in Catir,182 the 
majority was unwilling to “interpret a statute to effect” a modification of the law, 
absent “clear and explicit statutory language” demonstrating legislative intent to do 
so.183  Thus, the majority dismissed the dissent’s assertion that the Court’s 
interpretation of the MHRA would allow “landlords to avoid liability by simply 
alleging business necessity rather than proving it.”184  Instead, the majority found it 
unnecessary to reach the issue of business necessity because it concluded that 
sections 4582 and 4583 do not authorize disparate impact liability for claims of 
housing discrimination in connection with a landlord’s refusal to participate in the 
Section 8 voucher program, and therefore, Dussault had failed to make out a prima 
facie case of unlawful housing discrimination under the disparate impact theory.185 
The Court affirmed.186 
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E.  The Concurrence 
Concurring in the result and the Court’s reasoning, Justice Alexander joined 
the Court’s opinion and wrote separately to “note that the Maine Legislature has 
explicitly rejected the change in the law urged by the Dissent.”187  Justice 
Alexander further emphasized that the dissent’s approach “would interpret current 
Maine Law to mandate acceptance of onerous contract conditions” of Section 8 
programs, notwithstanding the capacity of some landlords to bear the cost of 
demonstrating “business necessity” to avoid the contractual requirements.188 
Pointing to the legislative history of section 4582, Justice Alexander noted that 
the provision, which would have required landlords to accept the Section 8 
“contractual burdens[,] was stricken from the legislation.”189  As a matter of 
statutory construction, Justice Alexander cautioned that “when a law has been 
interpreted by a judicial opinion, we do not later change that interpretation absent 
‘clear and explicit’ statutory language demonstrating legislative intent to change 
prior case law.”190 
F.  The Dissent 
Justice Levy, writing for two other dissenting justices, agreed with two 
conclusions of the Court: that the MHRA does “not make participation in the 
Section 8 housing assistance program mandatory” and that landlords are prohibited 
from intentionally discriminating against public assistance recipients under the 
Act.191  The dissent, however, concluded that the MHRA “prohibits housing 
practices that have a disparate impact on recipients of public assistance when such 
decisions are not justified by a business necessity.”192  Justice Levy also disagreed 
with the Court’s conclusion that Coach Lantern did not “refuse to rent” to Dussault 
within the meaning of section 4582.193 
The dissent first considered “whether Coach Lantern’s actions exposed it to 
liability pursuant to the MHRA.”194  In determining whether Coach Lantern was 
liable, the dissent observed that the majority opinion relied heavily on the Law 
Court’s previous decision in Catir,195 “which was decided before the ‘business 
necessity’ defense was added to section 4583 in 2007.”196  The dissent found the 
Catir decision “inapposite to the present case for several reasons.”197  After 
distinguishing that the Catir “summary judgment record demonstrated that the 
nursing home’s refusal to serve the plaintiffs as Medicaid patients was . . . based on 
its decision to no longer accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate,” the dissent 
observed that there was “no reason to consider whether the nursing home’s refusal 
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to accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate” was justified by business necessity, 
because the defense was added to section 4583 over twenty years later.198  Thus, 
the dissent observed that the issue in Catir did not concern a refusal to rent to 
Medicaid recipients, but rather a question of whether different terms of tenancy had 
been imposed.199  In relying on Catir to control the outcome of the case, the dissent 
found that the Court had “adopt[ed] too narrow a view of what it means for a 
landlord to ‘refuse to rent’ to a prospective tenant.”200  The dissent concluded that 
“regardless of the reason for its refusal, Coach Lantern ‘refused to rent’ to Dussault 
pursuant to the plain language of section 4582.”201 
The dissent also asserted that, despite Coach Lantern’s willingness to rent to 
Dussault, it would only have done so if Dussault “relinquished her status as a 
recipient of public assistance.”202  Moreover, the dissent stated that under the 
Court’s reading of section 4582, a landlord could refuse “to rent to a tenant based 
on the tenant’s protected status so long as the landlord simply asserted that it was 
‘willing’ to accept the tenant should she change her status.”203  Thus, under this 
alternative view of the facts, the dissent concluded that Coach Lantern’s actions 
constituted a refusal to rent to Dussault within the meaning of section 4582.204 
Finally, the dissent articulated three reasons why the majority’s interpretation 
of the language “primarily because of” incorrectly precluded the availability of 
disparate impact liability for public assistance recipients.205  First, the dissent 
asserted that the term “primarily because of” could have more than one meaning: 
“either (1) that the decision had a discriminatory purpose, or (2) that the decision 
resulted in a disparate impact on members of a protected group that was 
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”206  Second, the dissent 
reasoned that a structural interpretation of section 4582 as recognizing “a facially 
neutral housing practice that has a disparate impact” was consistent with the 
availability of a business necessity defense under section 4583, which creates a 
defense to liability under the MHRA for housing decisions “not based on” one of 
the protected classifications.207  Furthermore, in evaluating the statute’s legislative 
history, the dissent stated that the “Legislature’s intent to subject claims of housing 
discrimination based on the receipt of public assistance payments to disparate 
impact analysis, and to permit landlords to justify their practices based on a 
showing of business necessity, could not be clearer.”208  The dissent further refuted 
the concurrence’s assertion that legislative intent could be gleaned from the 
Judiciary Committee’s removal of section 2 from L.D. 685,209 because the same 
Committee also expressly stated its goal of applying disparate impact liability to 
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“unreasonable housing practices.”210  Third, the dissent stated that recognition of 
disparate impact liability as within sections 4582 and 4583 was consistent with 
federal law because “every federal court of appeals but one has concluded that” the 
antidiscrimination provision211 of the FHA “creates liability for intent-neutral 
disparate impact.”212 
Thus, on the merits of the case, the dissent determined that Coach Lantern’s 
“refusal to include the HUD tenancy addendum in its leases effectively excludes 
one hundred percent of Section 8 recipients from renting from Coach Lantern.”213  
According to the dissent, when the “inexorable zero exists, the prima facie 
inference of discrimination becomes strong.”214  The dissent observed that 
“[a]lthough Coach Lantern summarized the conditions of the addendum that it 
objects to, it failed to assert facts from which a fact-finder could determine that the 
conditions would interfere with any substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory 
interest associated with its business.”215  Thus, the dissent found that Coach 
Lantern failed to meet its burden of “showing that an actual business necessity 
justified its decision to refuse to include Section 8 addenda in its lease 
agreements.”216  The dissent concluded by acknowledging that the MHRA “does 
not compel landlords to participate in the Section 8 housing voucher program so 
long as the landlord’s decision does not intentionally discriminate against, or result 
in a disparate impact on, recipients of public assistance.”217  Given Dussault’s 
unrebutted prima facie case, the dissent would have vacated and remanded for 
entry of a judgment in Dussault’s favor.218 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Likely Impact of Dussault 
The Court’s holding—that Dussault failed to make out a prima facie case on 
each of her claims of liability and that disparate impact liability is unavailable for 
Section 8 recipients under the MHRA—represented a reasonable, but highly 
strained construction of the statute’s plain language and legislative history.  The 
majority’s interpretation of the availability of fair housing protections for Section 8 
recipients under the MHRA was particularly narrow in light of the statute’s 
apparent ambiguity and the majority’s explicit recognition that the MHRA’s 
purpose is to protect public assistance recipients’ rights to secure decent housing.219  
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Fair housing advocates were likely and justifiably disappointed by the outcome of 
the appeal.220  What’s of greater concern is that the Court’s holding could be cited 
as precedent to nullify the availability of protections under the MHRA for non-
Section 8 public assistance recipients in Maine, particularly if the applicable 
housing subsidy or general assistance program includes administrative 
requirements. 
What is clear is that landlords may see Dussault as a license to more easily 
deny housing opportunities to holders of Section 8 vouchers, especially in light of 
Maine’s competitive apartment rental market.221  With more than 10,000 Mainers 
on Section 8 waiting lists, 30,000 individuals eligible for Section 8 vouchers, and a 
“tight rental market” overall, “[t]here are many applicants and it’s certainly making 
it harder on Section 8.”222  Thus, Dussault provides a decreased incentive for 
landlords to accept Section 8 tenants,223 because landlords need only state that they 
would gladly rent to Section 8 tenants but for the requirements of the tenancy 
addendum or the program overall.  This does not seem to comport with the statute’s 
remedial purpose.224 
Maine faces particularly acute housing affordability issues, with one in three 
renters spending more than half of their income on housing costs.225  Although 
Maine needs approximately 56,000 affordable family rental units and 5,180 senior 
units to fill demand, development of new affordable rental units is often opposed 
by local communities fearful of adverse impacts.226  At the same time, existing 
rental stock has declined since 2000 and affordable rental housing for the low-
income population in Portland is “limited.”227   
When a prospective tenant has been explicitly denied housing on account of 
race, gender, the presence of children, or a variety of other protected classifications, 
the legal claim is clear and unambiguous.228  Landlords, however, possess 
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sufficient business and legal savvy to avoid such obvious distinctions.229  Instead, 
landlords may resort to more subtle, but equally damaging forms of 
discrimination.230  This may include discrimination on account of an individual’s 
use of public assistance to pay the rent.231  Thus, a landlord’s knowledge that a 
prospective tenant will rely on receipt of public assistance may also stand as a 
proxy or pretext for discrimination because of other protected classifications.232 
Those most impacted by source of income discrimination include individuals 
living with disabilities, single female heads of household, families with children, 
and members of racial minority groups.233  Moreover, the impact of public 
assistance discrimination has long-term effects.234  Despite the multiple objectives 
of national fair housing laws that envision communities with truly “integrated and 
balanced living patterns,”235 a landlord’s “no-voucher” policy may exacerbate the 
shift of low income tenants into substandard housing within impoverished 
neighborhoods.236 
B.  The Dussault Majority Reasonably Interpreted the MHRA’s Fair Housing  
Laws as Precluding Claims of Disparate Impact Made by Section 8  
Recipients, but the Interpretation Leads to Illogical Results. 
Although the Dussault majority reasonably interpreted sections 4582 and 4583 
as precluding disparate impact liability claims made by Section 8 recipients, its 
conclusion leads to illogical results.  As discussed below, there are three reasons 
why the majority reasonably construed the MHRA’s public assistance protections 
as precluding claims of disparate impact liability asserted by Section 8 recipients.  
However, under traditional canons of statutory construction in Maine, the 
majority’s interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language leads to “absurd, 
illogical, or inconsistent results.”237 
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1.  The Majority Reasonably Interpreted the MHRA as Precluding Disparate 
Impact Claims Made by Section 8 Recipients. 
The majority’s interpretation of the MHRA is justifiable on three grounds: 
First, the statute’s plain language demonstrates that Section 8 recipients are not 
entitled to the same scope of protection as other classifications within the MHRA.  
Second, the statute’s recent legislative history evidences a specific legislative intent 
to limit the availability of disparate impact claims to protected characteristics, and 
not because of the requirements of any public assistance programs.  Third, a brief 
examination of a similar housing discrimination case from Massachusetts helps 
demonstrate why the majority correctly distinguished between two types of public 
assistance discrimination: “status-based” discrimination and “program 
requirements” discrimination. 
In DiLiddo v. Oxford Street Realty, Inc.,238 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court interpreted a state fair housing law that prohibits landlords from 
discriminating against tenants who receive housing subsidies either “because the 
individual is such a recipient,” or “because of any requirement” of the public 
assistance program.239  The court held that the landlord’s refusal to rent an 
apartment to a housing subsidy recipient, because of the voucher program’s lease 
requirements, fell “squarely within the ambit of the prohibition of the statute.”240  
The court first reviewed its previous decision in Attorney General v. Brown,241 
which distinguished between discrimination “solely” because a prospective tenant 
holds a housing voucher and discrimination that occurs because a landlord refuses 
to accept the requirements of the housing program.242  The court observed that the 
legislature specifically amended the statutory language two years after the Brown 
decision, and “added new language making it unlawful for a landlord to 
discriminate against a housing subsidy recipient either ‘because the individual is 
such a recipient,’ or ‘because of any requirement of such public assistance, rental 
assistance, or housing subsidy program.’”243  Thus, the 1990 amendment to the 
Commonwealth’s law codified two “kinds of housing discrimination that [the] 
court had parsed so carefully in Brown” as unlawful.244 
Unlike the Massachusetts law at issue in DiLiddo, the plain language of the 
MHRA’s fair housing provisions proscribe only “status-based” discrimination.  
Section 4581 of the MHRA declares a civil right to “decent housing,” while 
guarding against discrimination on the basis of nine characteristics.245  By the 
statute’s plain language, the right of an individual to obtain housing “without 
discrimination because of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental 
disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status” does not extend to 
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an individual whose status includes receipt of public assistance and housing 
subsidies.246  Although the Maine Legislature has twice had the opportunity to add 
receipt of public assistance to section 4581’s listing, the Legislature has not 
incorporated such protections into the statute’s express listing of those entitled to a 
civil right to decent housing.247  Thus, the plain language of section 4581 supports 
the majority’s view that an individual’s status as a recipient of public assistance is 
distinct from other forms of discrimination protected under the statute. 
Similarly, the text of section 4582 makes a distinction between the nine 
classifications specified within section 4581248 and the class of individuals who 
receive protections on account of their status as public assistance recipients.  
Whereas the former receive broader protections under the MHRA, discrimination 
against public aid recipients is only prohibited in the context of “refus[ing] to rent 
or impos[ing] different terms of tenancy . . . primarily because of the individual’s 
status as recipient.”249  Thus, by the statute’s plain language, the question of 
whether disparate impact liability is available for Section 8 recipients turns on 
whether an individual’s “status as recipient” includes participation in the Section 8 
voucher program, as well as the landlord requirements contained therein.  In other 
words, does a landlord’s refusal to affirmatively accept the requirements of Section 
8 transform a landlord’s willingness to rent into unlawful housing discrimination? 
Finally, the legislative history of sections 4582 and 4583 is instructive and 
supports the majority’s view that “status-based discrimination” does not open the 
door to a claim for disparate impact housing discrimination on the basis of receipt 
of Section 8 assistance.  In 2007, the Judiciary Committee considered amending 
section 4582 to include the exact same “program-requirements” provision that 
Massachusetts codified in 1990 and later interpreted in DiLiddo.250  Whereas the 
language as originally proposed for section 4582 would have broadened the 
MHRA’s protections for recipients of public assistance—codifying both “status-
based” and “program-requirements” discrimination—the final amendments to the 
MHRA dropped the latter type, and at the same time, modified the language of 
section 4583 to clarify the availability of a “business necessity” defense for neutral 
housing practices with disparate impacts on any protected class.251  Thus, had the 
Legislature intended to extend disparate impact liability to “program-requirements” 
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discrimination, the Legislature could have expressly included that language in 
section 4583.  Instead, the Legislature only enacted disparate impact liability for 
claims of “status-based” housing discrimination, as well as claims brought because 
of the nine other classifications listed in section 4581.252 
2.  The Majority’s Interpretation of the Public Assistance Protections Under the 
MHRA for Section 8 Recipients Renders the Statute a Nullity. 
The Law Court set forth the guidelines for statutory construction of general 
assistance statutes in Coker v. City of Lewiston.253  When interpreting a statute, the 
Court first looks to the “plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of 
effecting the legislative intent.”254  Only if the statutory language is ambiguous will 
the Court “examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history.”255  
The Court interprets the statutory scheme “from which the language arises” in 
order “to achieve a harmonious result.”256  Finally, the Court “will not construe 
statutory language to effect absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results.”257 
Given the 4-3 split decision of the Court,258 the statutory language of section 
4582, which made it unlawful to “refuse to rent or impose different terms of 
tenancy . . . primarily because of the individual’s status” as a public assistance 
recipient, was almost certainly ambiguous.  In light of this ambiguity, the 
majority’s heavy reliance259 on the legislature’s 2007 rejection of the program-
requirements provision was inconsistent with the majority’s simultaneous 
recognition that the legislative intent included a desire to “protect public assistance 
recipients’ rights to secure decent housing.”260  Moreover, had the Court looked 
further back to the legislative history surrounding the actual 1975 enactment (rather 
than lack of enactment of the 2007 amendment) of the protections against housing 
discrimination for recipients of public assistance, the majority could just as easily 
have ascertained a legislative intent to remedy “[o]ne of the largest housing 
problems” faced by Maine families: “discrimination by potential landlords against 
families receiving public assistance.”261  Although the statute’s language was 
ambiguous, the purpose of the statute was clear: “to enable those citizens of Maine 
most in need of housing to have a fair and equal chance of obtaining it.”262  Today, 
this includes participation in the most popular form of housing assistance in 
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America.263 
Despite such legislative intent, the majority’s holding renders the statute a 
nullity and potentially leads to inconsistent results because a landlord can decline to 
rent to a prospective tenant any time the tenant relies on a form of housing 
assistance that also includes administrative requirements for the landlord.  In this 
respect, the majority’s significant reliance on Catir264 is also misplaced because, 
unlike the plaintiffs in Catir, Section 8 recipients can afford to pay the rent.265  
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether a landlord can assert a business necessity 
for declining to rent, a provision which the majority’s interpretation also makes 
unnecessary within the overall statutory scheme as applied to Section 8 recipients.  
If this is not the case, then what remains of the statute’s purpose is a legislative 
intent to protect public assistance recipients from housing discrimination solely on 
account of the stereotypes or generalized bias against such recipients.  Because any 
form of public assistance is likely to include programmatic requirements for its 
participants, only incompetent or unthinking landlords would fit within such a 
construction, leaving many low-income individuals without a fair and equal chance 
of obtaining decent housing. 
In this regard, the dissent’s assertion that Coach Lantern failed to rebut 
Dussault’s prima facie case should have prevailed,266 because a landlord who 
refuses to rent to a Section 8 recipient because of the program’s administrative 
requirements should be required to demonstrate that the voluntary federal program 
poses burdens that are inconsistent with business necessity, and Coach Lantern 
made no such showing.  Nevertheless, only the legislature can achieve such a 
result. 
C.  The Maine Legislature Should Amend the MHRA’s Definition of  
Discrimination on the Basis of Status as a Public Assistance  
Recipient to Include Section 8 Recipients. 
The Legislature should consider amending section 4581-A(4) of the MHRA to 
expressly include recipients of Section 8 vouchers.267  The Section 8 program is the 
largest and most expansive housing subsidy program in the nation.268  Accordingly, 
the Legislature should reflect in current law the legal reach of the housing program 
that most directly impacts Maine’s landlords and rental population.  Although 
                                                                                                     
 263. See Bruce Zucker & Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, Section 8 Voucher Program: The Benefits and 
Pitfalls of Renting to Residential Tenants Receiving Federally Subsidized Housing, 43 REAL ESTATE 
L.J. 38, 38-39 (2014) (stating that Section 8 is the “dominant form of federal housing assistance” and 
that over two million households participate in the program). 
 264. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
 265. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 266. See discussion supra Part III.F. 
 267. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21(e) (2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659a.421(1)(d) (West 
2014). 
 268. See America’s Rental Housing: Evolving Markets and Needs, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV. 35 (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/ 
jchs_americas_rental_housing_2013_1_0.pdf (identifying 2.2 million users of voucher subsidies 
nationwide, making Section 8 the largest federal housing assistance program). 
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controversial,269 doing so would bring much needed clarity and relief to an area of 
fair housing law likely to see increasing activity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Section 8 tenants like Nicole Dussault were unfortunately set back by the 
Court’s decision.  Although the majority reasonably interpreted that disparate 
impact liability is not available for claims of Section 8 recipients brought under the 
MHRA because of the voluntary nature of the federally funded Section 8 housing 
program, the Court’s approach also appeared inconsistent with general principles of 
statutory construction.  Accordingly, the decision should be narrowly read and 
limited in precedential value to just precluding disparate claims brought by Section 
8 recipients under the MHRA.  Moreover, the Maine Legislature is in the best 
position to clarify the statute’s broader protections and bolster its effectiveness by 
expressly including Section 8 coverage.  Irrespective of one’s beliefs concerning 
the efficacy of Section 8,270 Maine’s low-income housing population and apartment 
owners should be encouraged to operate transparently and know with certainty 
where they stand.271 
  
                                                                                                     
 269. See Manny Fernandez, Mayor Vetoes Bill Protecting Section 8 Tenants From Landlord Bias, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/01/nyregion/01housing.html (describing a 
New York City bill that would have made it illegal for landlords to refuse tenants who intended to pay 
rent using Section 8 vouchers). 
 270. See Evie Blad, 50 Years Later, Housing Programs’ Reach is Limited, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 25, 
2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/26/26wophousing_ep.h33.html (providing an in-
depth review and analysis of diverse perspectives regarding the low-income housing crisis in America). 
 271. See Zucker & Zucker, supra note 263, at 45-46 (“Providing low-income families the benefit of 
safe, sanitary, and affordable housing while simultaneously giving private property owners the ability to 
earn reasonable profits” makes the Section 8 program a “successful investment for all stakeholders.”).  

